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Hume, Cicero, and Eighteenth-Century Moral Philosophy 
Tim Stuart-Buttle (tim.stuart-buttle@york.ac.uk)1  
*Draft chapter: please do not cite without the author’s permission* 
The Ciceronian age held a particular allure for early modern philosophers, who were confronted with 
the bloody aftermath of the Protestant Reformation and the continuing schisms to which it gave rise. 
In an age of rampant religious, political, and philosophical partisanship, in which rival sects defended 
their definitions of truth with the pen and sword, the late Roman Republic appeared to those of eirenic 
tastes to be an epoch of intellectual freedom. Humanist proponents of religious toleration, from 
Erasmus onwards, observed how in Cicero’s time philosophers could disagree on even the most 
fundamental of doctrines, and yet do so politely. Cicero’s dialogues, in which he mediated between 
the arguments of the rival philosophical sects, provided a model of how intellectual debate ought to 
be conducted. Notwithstanding their differences on speculative questions, the heathen philosophers 
lived peaceably together in a society guided by a shared, practical concern for the common good.2 
Even in the mid-eighteenth century the Ciceronian age retained its appeal for those philosophers, such 
as David Hume, who chafed against the tendency of less enlightened individuals to refuse to break 
bread with any whose views on purely speculative questions happened to differ from their own. To 
one of his critics, Hume proposed reviving “the happy times, when Atticus and Cassius the 
Epicureans, Cicero the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could, all of them, live in unreserved 
friendship together”.3 As this chapter will attempt to show, however, Hume’s admiration for “Cicero 
the Academic” went beyond this rather conventional yearning for the recrudescence of the benign 
spirit of the libertas philosophandi. As a philosopher in his own right, Hume argued, Cicero had 
something unique—and uniquely important—to say about the question which, in a Christian age, was 
the most vexed of all: the proper relationship between moral philosophy and moral theology. Hume 
invited his readers, almost all of whom could be expected to be well-versed in their Cicero, to 
recognise how his own moral theory and philosophy of religion were constructed upon Ciceronian 
(and sceptical) foundations. In so doing, however, Hume asked his readers to interpret Cicero’s 
philosophical commitments in a very particular (and, when set against the context of most 
contemporary readings of Cicero, a very unusual) way. 
In a footnote added to the 1764 edition of the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals 
(1751), Hume declared in uncharacteristically oracular fashion that “CICERO, … in a dispute, which 
is chiefly verbal, must, on account of the author, carry an authority, from which there can be no 
appeal” (EPM, 106 n.72).4 Here, as Isabel Rivers observes, Hume “breathtakingly attributes a quasi-
scriptural status” to Cicero’s philosophical writings.5 Even more breath-taking, however, was the 
range of questions which Hume denominated “chiefly verbal”. These were precisely the seemingly 
intractable issues upon which recent moral and political philosophers had disagreed most profoundly. 
The most pertinent included “the vulgar dispute concerning the degrees of benevolence or self-love, 
                                                          
1  I am grateful to seminar audiences in Edinburgh and Antwerp for commenting helpfully on earlier versions of this 
essay. 
2  Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996).   
3  Hume to [James Balfour], 15 Mar. 1753, in Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1932), i, 173. For a similar plea, see the “Dedication” (to John Home), in Four Dissertations 
(London, 1757), ii; and for discussion, see James A. Harris, Hume: An Intellectual Biography (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 297–302. 
4  An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 
page references are provided in brackets in the text, as above.  
5  Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660–1780, 
2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991–2000), ii, 299. 
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which prevail in human nature”; whether morality, justice, and society were natural or artificial (EPM, 
98-99); whether “pride” was “good or bad”; and whether only those actions motivated by 
disinterested benevolence were to be deemed virtuous (EPM, 106). These questions were, in turn, 
intimately related to another, denominated “merely verbal” by a dying Hume in a paragraph added to 
the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion in 1776: this regarded the nature and attributes of a divine 
being.6 
In treating of all of these highly contentious points, Hume claimed to draw from Cicero’s 
incontestable authority. Whilst Hume’s general esteem for Cicero has been widely noted, the 
literature on the subject has scarcely scratched the surface. In part, this is because scholars interested 
in Hume’s relationship to Cicero have sought to address two, seemingly separable issues. The first is 
the nature of Hume’s epistemological scepticism, most fully developed in Book I of A Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739) and subsequently offered in revised form in An Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding (1748); and the second, the position adopted by Hume in a work—the Dialogues—
which was clearly modelled on Cicero’s De Natura Deorum.7 I contend that Hume’s presentation of 
Cicero can tell us a great deal more about his most fundamental philosophical objectives, and how he 
sought to advance them.  
Hume’s interpretation of Cicero’s philosophical commitments was highly distinctive. 
Cicero was, in Hume’s hands, a uniquely eclectic philosopher, whose academic scepticism set him 
apart from the dogmatic philosophical sects by which he was surrounded.8 Most notably, this 
interpretation suggested that Cicero had been critical of many of the cardinal philosophical doctrines 
of both the Stoics and Epicureans: the two late Hellenistic sects whose thinking was widely held by 
contemporaries to exercise a pervasive influence on how early modern philosophers framed, and 
sought to address, the most important questions under discussion in the period.9 This, Hume 
suggested, explained why Cicero—unlike the dogmatic Stoics and Epicureans—had avoided “chiefly 
verbal” hypothetical questions, and instead offered a treatment of morals which was founded, like 
Hume’s own in A Treatise, on “the experimental method” (that is, experience and observation). 
Although this presentation of Cicero as adopting an empirical approach in his moral inquiries was 
distinctive, it was not unique to Hume. John Locke, whom Hume credited as pioneering the “science 
of MAN”, read Cicero in a very similar way (T, Introduction, 5 n.1).10 As in the case of Hume, even 
as many scholars have noted Locke’s abundantly attested admiration for Cicero’s philosophy, they 
have paid insufficient attention to the question of how Locke read Cicero—that is, as an academic 
                                                          
6  Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and Other Writings, ed. Dorothy Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 92–93. M.A. Stewart considers Hume’s late addition to the Dialogues to be his “dying testament to 
posterity”: “The Dating of Hume’s Manuscripts”, in The Scottish Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation, ed. Paul 
Wood (Woodbridge: University of Rochester Press, 2000), 303. 
7  On the former, see (inter alia): Stephen Buckle, “British Sceptical Realism”, European Journal of Philosophy 7:1 
(1999), 1–29; and John P. Wright, “Hume’s Academic Scepticism: a Reappraisal of his Philosophy of Human 
Understanding”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16:3 (1986), 407–35. There is an extensive literature on the 
Dialogues, and Cicero’s presiding presence within them, but see especially: John V. Price, “Sceptics in Cicero and 
Hume”, Journal of the History of Ideas 25:1 (1964), 97–106; Christine Battersby, “The Dialogues as Original 
Imitation: Cicero and the Nature of Hume’s Skepticism”, in McGill Hume Studies, ed. David F. Norton, Nicholas 
Capaldi, and Wade L. Robison (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979), 239–52; and Peter S. Fosl, “Doubt and Divinity: 
Cicero’s Influence on Hume’s Religious Skepticism”, Hume Studies 20 (1994), 103–20. 
8  For the significance of interpretations of Cicero as an academic sceptic in an earlier period, see Charles B. Schmitt, 
Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). 
9  For a brief review of the (now extensive) scholarship on the pervasive interest in Stoicism and Epicureanism in the 
period, see Ben Dew, “Epicurean and Stoic Enlightenments: The Return of Modern Paganism?”, History Compass 
13:1 (2013), 486–95. 
10  Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007): where appropriate, references to Book, Part, Section and Paragraph are provided in parentheses in the 
text. 
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sceptic—and why he considered Cicero’s writings to be so uniquely valuable.11 This shortcoming 
alerts us to the more general need to consider carefully the intellectual, institutional, and polemical 
contexts in which early modern philosophers turned to ancient philosophy, and invoked particular 
predecessors as vindicating both the approaches they adopted and the substantive conclusions they 
drew. As Dmitri Levitin has argued forcefully in a valuable recent contribution, in an important sense 
there were no Stoics, Epicureans, or academic sceptics in the early modern period. Philosophers were 
selective in their interpretation and borrowings, and their approaches to the philosophical bequest of 
the ancient world were mediated by centuries of humanist scholarship, commentary, and critique (and 
usually framed by Christian apologetic concerns).12 It is, then, important to ask what they took 
themselves to be doing in “picking out certain characteristics of an ancient position and using them 
to denote a modern one”.13   
As I show in the first section of this essay, Cicero occupies a central place in Locke’s 
deeply problematic attempt to construct a moral theology. The heathen philosopher, on Locke’s 
reading as on Hume’s, had something uniquely valuable to say about the vexed relationship between 
morality and religious belief, and between reason and revelation as the two sources of human 
knowledge. Yet Hume’s explanation of what Cicero had to say here was very different indeed to that 
offered by Locke. In the second section I argue that it was, in part, through his interpretation of Cicero 
that Hume forcefully denied what Locke had sought to establish: that an empirical science of morality 
could only get so far, because a full understanding of moral obligation relied upon theological 
postulates which had been revealed rather than discovered. By placing Hume’s interpretation of 
Cicero “after” Locke’s, I contend, we are better placed to appreciate that Hume’s primary objective—
and, from his perspective, greatest achievement—was to explain society and morality in terms which 
were entirely independent of the question of God’s attributes, will, sanctions, and even existence. 
Even as the focus is placed squarely on them, it should nonetheless be noted that Locke and Hume 
were quite consciously intervening in a much wider, long-running, and heated European debate 
regarding Cicero’s philosophical commitments, in which the relationship between morality and 
religious belief occupied a central place.14 
***** 
In the Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke distinguished between moral 
motivation and obligation in a quite novel way. “It must be allowed”, Locke argued, “that several 
Moral Rules, may receive, from Mankind, a very general Approbation, without either knowing, or 
admitting the true ground of Morality” (EHU 1.3.6). Locke pointed to the heathen world to 
substantiate this claim. “Even in the Corruption of Manners,” Locke declared, “the true Boundaries 
of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserved” 
(EHU 2.28.11). The heathens—and here Locke’s primary example was the late Roman Republic in 
the age of Cicero—had clearly failed to comprehend “the true ground of Morality” in God’s will and 
                                                          
11  For discussions of Locke’s esteem for Cicero, see especially Giuliana di Biase, La Morale di Locke: Fra Prudenza e 
Mediocritas (Rome: Carocci, 2012); John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 157–204, 292–326; Phillip Mitsis, “Locke’s Offices”, in Hellenistic and Early 
Modern Philosophy, ed. Jon Miller and Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 45–61; 
Raymond Polin, La Politique Morale de John Locke (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1960); and Neal Wood, 
The Politics of Locke’s Philosophy: A Social Study of “An Essay concerning Human Understanding” (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), 29–30. 
12  Dmitri Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories of Philosophy in England, c. 1640–1700 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4 and passim. 
13  István Hont, Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, edited by Béla Kapossy and 
Michael Sonenscher (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 11. 
14  For a sense of this broader context, see Tim Stuart-Buttle, From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy: Cicero and 
Visions of Humanity from Locke to Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2018). 
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command. In ancient Rome, moral philosophy and divinity were “two parts or provinces of 
knowledge” between which there was no overlap.15 As a result, philosophers had sought—vainly—
to explain the nature and foundations of moral duty on the basis of human nature alone, and without 
any reference to divine will and command. “The philosophers of old”, Locke declared, “did in vain 
enquire, whether the Summum bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or 
Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found 
in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts” (EHU, 2.21.55). Here Locke was as sceptical as Hobbes regarding the 
ancient moralists’ success in identifying man’s true end on the basis of autonomous reason.16 Yet 
Locke’s reasoning here was importantly different to that of Hobbes: they had failed, Locke argued, 
because of their ignorance of the true God, who imposed duties on men and would reward or punish 
them on the Day of Judgment. Meanwhile, Locke argued that in most areas of human life, particularly 
those of greatest concern (morality, religion and justice), the individual would necessarily deal in 
probabilities: something the dogmatic sects, craving certainty, had been unwilling to recognise.17 Yet 
in practice heathen societies had nonetheless been led to behave in ways broadly in accordance with 
the immutable duties of natural law, even as the individuals within them did not understand why they 
ought to do so. Here it is important to ask two questions: why did Locke separate moral motivation 
and obligation, and how did he explain the relationship between them? 
The Essay was intended to explore a question which, Locke argued, had been 
unsatisfactorily addressed: that of the relationship between “the principles of Morality and reveal’d 
Religion”.18 Even as the individual’s natural faculties were “sufficient” to establish all the knowledge 
they required to perform their duties, this did not mean that in the absence of revelation they could 
grasp all the truths they now considered to be essential. In his mature, published writings, Locke 
argued that revelation had provided what reason had not: a normative theory of morals, and thus an 
explanation of why humanity’s duties under natural law were obligatory.19 Christ’s revelation 
affirmed, explained, and enlarged upon those insights gained through the individual’s experience in 
a morally ordered cosmos. In this regard, true philosophy and revealed theology were in perfect 
harmony. In making this case, Locke offered up a classical moralist as an exemplar of how to practice 
true philosophy, and used him as proof that the right cultivation of one’s natural faculties led to 
insights which were perfectly consistent (although far from coextensive) with the truths revealed by 
Christ. This classical moralist was Cicero, whose academic scepticism (as defined in the Academica) 
privileged probability whilst nonetheless emphasising the duty to labour for truth even as certain 
                                                          
15  Bodleian Library: MS Locke, Film 77, 93 (1698); Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), in Writings on 
Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 194–95. 
16  Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Noel Malcolm, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ii, 150 (1.11). Locke 
would have found similar depreciations of the value of classical moral philosophy in the writings of, inter alia, 
Montaigne, Charron, and Gassendi. On moral scepticism in this period, see Richard H. Popkin, The History of 
Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, rvd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
17  For Locke’s elision of the conventional scholastic distinction between scientia and opinio, see Douglas Casson, 
Liberating Judgment: Fanatics, Skeptics, and John Locke’s Politics of Probability (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011). 
18 See James Tyrrell’s marginal note in his copy of the Essay in the British Museum, quoted by John Colman, John 
Locke’s Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 1–2. As early as 1661, Locke noted that 
“the greatest caution should be taken lest, having trusted too much in our reason, we neglect faith, and, by not having 
given due regard to the mysteries of the gospel, we embrace philosophy instead of religion”: The National Archives, 
Shaftesbury Papers, 30/24/47/33 (c. 1661–1662). (The entry is in Latin; the translation is Nuovo’s: Writings on 
Religion, 71). For discussion, see Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy”, in John Locke: 
Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 194–223. 
19 Locke’s earliest treatment of natural law, dating from c.1663–1664, was rather more optimistic regarding man’s 
ability, by reason alone, to identify the most cardinal truths in morality and theology, even as he was witheringly 
sceptical of the ancient philosophers’ attempts to do so: see Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. and trans. Wolfgang von 
Leyden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954). 
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knowledge in many areas of life might be unattainable.20 The harmony between Cicero’s philosophy 
and Christ’s teachings was repeatedly alluded to by Locke: on the title-page of the Essay, where a 
citation from De Natura Deorum was (from 1700) accompanied by another from the Scriptures; at 
multiple points in the Reasonableness of Christianity (1695); and in his educational writings, in which 
Locke recommended De Officiis as the sole work of moral philosophy to which youths ought to be 
introduced, and which along with the Gospels provided all the moral guidance they required.21 
In the account of how the individual might acquire true moral knowledge in the Essay, 
Locke indicated why he considered Cicero’s philosophy to be unique. Unlike the dogmatic 
philosophical sects, Cicero had recognised the impossibility of establishing a definition of man’s true 
end and happiness on the basis of autonomous reason alone. Here Locke alluded to Cicero’s focus in 
his moral teachings, and especially in De Officiis, on the utility (utile) and agreeableness (dulce) of 
virtue to oneself and others rather than on its normative truth (honestum). “It is never beneficial to do 
wrong”, Cicero declared in De Officiis, “because it is always dishonourable; moreover, because it is 
always honourable to be a good man, it is always beneficial”.22 This was precisely the point developed 
at length by Locke in the Essay which, as with Locke’s thinking as a whole, is indelibly structured 
by a divine teleology. Locke argued that God had ordered the world (and human nature) in such a 
way as to ensure that what conduced to the collective happiness of mankind in this world was 
consistent with the immutable duties of natural law. To be sure, estimations of pleasure and pain 
shaped the individual’s ideas of what was good or evil: here Locke adopted a hedonic psychology 
which reflected his engagement with contemporary French philosophical currents of thought (and 
notably with Pierre Gassendi).23 Yet God was the author of man’s desires, as well as his reason. Man 
had been created so that, in society, he found it in his interest to behave in ways which served God’s 
ends, even as he might fail rationally to understand his duty to do so.24 God in His goodness had, “by 
an inseparable connexion, joined Virtue and publick Happiness together; and made the Practice 
thereof, necessary to the preservation of Society, and visibly beneficial to all, with whom the Virtuous 
Man has to do” (EHU 1.3.6). By pursuing comfort, security and happiness in society, individuals 
tended to act in ways consistent with the dictates of the divinely authored law of nature—even as they 
lacked any comprehension of the true origins and nature of that law, or of the eternal sanctions 
enforcing it.  
The individual’s greatest concern, Locke argued, was to secure the good opinion of his 
neighbours (praise), and to avoid their contempt (shame). It was “a Burthen too heavy for humane 
Sufferance”, Locke declared, “to live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his 
Familiars, and those he converses with” (EHU, 2.28.12). This pervasive desire for “esteem and 
reputation” served effectively, insensibly, and quite naturally to render the individual’s sense of their 
own interest broadly conformable to that of the society of which they were a part, so concerned were 
they to win the approval of others. Led by their “needs and wants” to gather together in society, the 
individual’s ideas concerning good and ill were shaped by what, in the Second Treatise, Locke called 
                                                          
20  See, for one such statement, Academica, trans. Harry Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 
2.3.7-8. 
21 Cf. Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693), ed. John W. Yolton & Jean S. Yolton (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 239; “Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study” (1703), in The Educational Writings of John 
Locke, ed. James L. Axtell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 399–400. 
22 On Duties, ed. M.T. Griffin & E. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3.64. 
23 For the most forceful statement of Locke’s intellectual debt to Gassendi, see T.M. Lennon, The Battle of the Gods and 
Giants: The Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655–1715 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 149–90. 
24 The classic work on the development of the language of “interest” in this period, and on the increasingly positive role 
accorded to it in facilitating social harmony and cooperation, is Albert O. Hirschmann, The Passions and the Interests: 
Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).  
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“the mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion” they experienced with others.25 As Locke 
repeatedly emphasised, this gave rise to a “law of propriety”, by which almost all men found it useful 
and agreeable to abide, and which was contingent and developed according to what was found to be 
publicly useful.26  
This, for Locke, emphatically did not mean that public utility and pleasure were sufficient 
to explain moral good and ill. “The rightness of an action”, Locke declared, “does not depend on its 
utility; on the contrary, its utility is a result of its rightness”.27 This was a point which the 
Epicureans—and their modern admirers, such as Hobbes—had failed to comprehend. Even in the 
ancient world, however, only Cicero, Locke argued, had recognised these moral distinctions to have 
developed solely on the basis of their communal utility as attested by experience and observation 
(EHU 2.28.11). Cicero nonetheless identified the limits of reason properly to understand the true 
foundations of moral obligation: these had been revealed in full by Christ, rather than discovered by 
reason. This explained, Locke argued, why in his writings on morality Cicero had exhorted men to 
virtue on account of its utility and agreeableness, rather than on the basis of its normative truth. This 
also helps us to understand why, for Locke, Cicero’s moral philosophy was so uniquely valuable: it 
left a conceptual space which had subsequently been filled by Christ’s revelation. Locke’s Cicero, as 
an academic sceptic, recognised the limits of reason in the face of God’s omnipotence. In De Officiis, 
Cicero had sought to outline those moral qualities which conduced to the well-being of society in all 
times and at all places, in order to construct immutable ideal archetypes—such as the Golden Rule 
(“do unto others”). “The Truth and Certainty of moral Discourses”, Locke declared, “abstracts from 
the Lives of Men, and the Existence of those Vertues in the World, whereof they treat: Nor are Tully’s 
Offices less true, because there is no Body in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives up 
to that pattern of a vertuous Man, which he has given us, and which existed no where, when he writ, 
but in Idea” (EHU 4.4.8). It was only with Christ’s ministry, something discussed at length in the 
Reasonableness of Christianity, that a “vertuous Man” appeared who was able exactly to practise 
these rules and, as importantly, to explain to mankind why they ought to do likewise as God’s created 
beings, accountable to Him on the Day of Judgment. 
On Locke’s account, Cicero nonetheless employed his “Reason to understand those Truths, 
which have given [the virtues their] reputation” in the first place (EHU 1.4.23). Yet Cicero was 
constrained to rest content with communal utility and agreeableness as his fundamental explanatory 
principles. The total separation between ethics and divinity in ancient Rome precluded even Cicero 
from locating moral obligation in the divine will: in the Reasonableness, Locke included “Tully” 
among those ancients who had failed to establish ethics upon its true foundations.28 It is nonetheless 
important to note that Locke’s own, distinctly anti-metaphysical philosophical “proofs” for the 
existence of God and a future state were drawn directly and explicitly from Cicero.29 Locke alighted 
upon Cicero as an example of how far reason could reach in the absence of revelation. This had real 
implications for Christian apologetic: that is, for the foundations upon which Christians should 
establish and defend their faith. In the Reasonableness, Locke declared that all too many so-called 
                                                          
25 Locke Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Second 
Treatise, §212. 
26 For an extensive discussion of this neglected aspect of Locke’s thinking, see Tim Stuart-Buttle, “‘A Burthen Too 
Heavy for Humane Sufferance’: Locke on Reputation”, History of Political Thought 38:4 (2017), 644-80. 
27 Essays on the Law of Nature, 215. 
28  Reasonableness of Christianity, 196. 
29  For Locke’s distinctly anti-metaphysical proofs for the existence of God, drawn primarily from Cicero’s De Legibus, 
see EHU 4.10.6. John Dunn calls Locke’s proofs “flaccid”: The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical 
Account of the “Two Treatises of Government” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 14; see, too, Victor 
Nuovo, Christianity, Antiquity, and Enlightenment: Interpretations of Locke (London: Springer, 2011), 53–73. 
Meanwhile Leo Strauss and his followers have interpreted Locke’s equivocatory treatment of these questions as 
illustrating his supposed religious scepticism. 
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Christian philosophers, like their dogmatic heathen predecessors, sought to establish the foundations 
of men’s moral duties on the basis of philosophy—failing to recognise how revelation had enlarged 
upon reason on this point:  
 
… many are beholden to Revelation, who do not acknowledge it. ’Tis no diminishing to 
Revelation, that Reason gives its Suffrage too to the Truths Revelation has discovered. But ’tis 
our mistake to think, that because Reason confirms them to us, we had the first certain 
knowledge of them from thence, and in that clear Evidence we now possess them. The contrary 
is manifest, in the defective morality of the Gentiles before our Saviour’s time …30 
  
All too many Christian philosophers, Locke argued, sought to establish the truth of Christianity on 
the basis of speculative philosophy (metaphysics). In so doing they—unlike Cicero—disturbed the 
natural harmony between reason and revelation: by giving too much to the former, they failed to 
recognise both the reasonableness and necessity of the latter.  
Despite the centrality of a future state to his moral theology, Locke maintained that, whilst there 
were good moral arguments for the soul’s immortality, the primary argument used by Christians to 
defend it—immateriality—was weak at best. Here once more Locke turned to Cicero, in this instance 
the Tusculan Disputations, to re-establish how far reason could reach, and had reached in this 
question in the absence of revelation: that is, to recover the status quo ante. Cicero’s evaluation of 
the evidence for and against the immateriality of the soul, Locke emphasised, did not lead him to 
deny its immortality: the question of immateriality, on which Locke was similarly studiously agnostic, 
was “academic” in every sense. Only once the limits of reason on this point were grasped might the 
necessity of Christ’s teachings, and the harmony between true philosophy and revealed theology, 
again come into view: 
 
So unmoveable is that truth delivered by the spirit of truth, that though the light of nature gave 
[Cicero] some obscure glimmering, some uncertain hopes of a future state;  yet human reason 
could attain no clearness, no certainty about it, but that it was “JESUS CHRIST alone who 
brought life and immortality to light through the gospel”. Though we are now told, that to own 
the inability of natural reason to bring immortality to light, or, which passes for the same, to 
own principles upon which the immateriality of the soul (and, as it is urged, consequently its 
immortality) cannot be demonstratively proved; does lessen the belief in this article of 
revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to light, and which consequently the 
scripture assures us is established and made certain only by revelation.31  
 
For Locke, one, if not the strongest, argument attesting to the truth of revealed Christianity was that 
it offered what philosophy could not: an account of moral obligation and man’s true end. Cicero’s 
academic scepticism had led him, in his philosophical dialogues, to criticise the dogmatic and 
exclusivist theories of the summum bonum concocted by his fellow philosophers, whilst nonetheless 
remaining open to the delivery of revealed truth. 
***** 
In Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), Hume famously declared that “moral 
philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time of 
Copernicus” (T 2.1.4: 30). This comment bears a marked resemblance to a passage in Hume’s letter 
                                                          
30  Reasonableness of Christianity, 200. 
31 A Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester…, in The Works of John Locke, 9 vols. (London, 1794; repr. London: 
Routledge/ Thoemmes, 1997), iii, 489 (Locke cites 2 Tim. 1.10). 
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to a physician of 1734, in which he observed that “the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by 
Antiquity” remained “entirely Hypothetical, & depending more upon Invention than Experience”. As 
Hume’s invocation of Copernicus suggests, modern philosophers had proved no more successful than 
the ancients on this score. This insight led Hume, in the years which followed, “to seek out some new 
Medium, by which Truth might be establisht”.32  
Hume made this point powerfully in a letter to one such modern philosopher, Francis 
Hutcheson, in response to his criticisms of a draft of Book III (“Of Morals”) of A Treatise. 
Hutcheson’s own ethical theory, Hume observed, remained “founded on final Causes; which is a 
consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of 
Man? Is he created for Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or the next? For himself or for his 
Maker?” These were precisely the sort of “endless” questions which Hume would later dismiss as 
“merely verbal”. Hutcheson’s moral theory fell into the same trap which, Locke had argued, 
bedevilled ancient Stoic ethics: it assumed that men might be motivated to virtue for virtue’s sake. 
Cicero, Hume argued, recognised that “Virtue can never be the sole Motive to any Action”: pleasure 
and utility must occupy a central place in any account of moral motivation. Hume invited Hutcheson 
to review both De Officiis and Book IV of the dialogue De Finibus.33 As for Locke, the signal merit 
of De Officiis for Hume was that it offered a treatment of morality which focused squarely on the 
utility and agreeableness of virtue. Meanwhile in Book IV of De Finibus, the definition of the 
summum bonum furnished by the Stoic Cato was refuted by the academic sceptic (Cicero himself). 
Hume noted in “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742) that, in De Finibus, Cicero 
was so anxious to critique Cato’s Stoic ethical theory that he failed to observe “the true spirit of 
dialogue” which, in his other writings, was such a conspicuous feature of Ciceronian philosophy. In 
this regard, Hume intimated, Cicero’s academic scepticism in no sense precluded the drawing of firm 
conclusions in his moral theory: indeed, it underpinned, rather than mitigated his unequivocal and 
rather dogmatic rejection of final causes in moral philosophy.34  
If Hume’s presentation of Cicero bears an unmistakeable resemblance to Locke’s, it is 
nonetheless clear that from an early stage Hume rejected what Locke had strenuously maintained: 
that revealed Christianity could provide what moral philosophy alone had not. Cicero had something 
rather different to say on the question of the relationship between morality and religious belief. In the 
Introduction to A Treatise, Hume opined that natural theology was “in some measure dependent on 
the science of MAN” (T, “Introduction”, 4). If, for reasons of prudence, Hume largely avoided 
exploring this point in A Treatise, his correspondence indicates that his inquiries from the later 1720s 
led to a profound questioning of the philosophical foundations of religious belief.35 Even in the 
                                                          
32 Hume to ?, 1734, in Letters, i, 12–18 (italics added). For discussion of the importance of this letter for our 
understanding of Hume’s early intellectual development, see Harris, Hume: An Intellectual Biography, 35–77; and 
M.A. Stewart, “Hume’s Intellectual Development, 1711–1752”, in Impressions of Hume, ed. Marina Frasca-Spada 
and Peter J.E. Kail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 11–58. 
33 Hume to Hutcheson, 17 Sept. 1739, in Letters, i, 33. On Hume’s critique of the teleological dimension of Hutcheson’s 
moral theory, see James Moore, “The Social Background of Hume’s ‘Science of Human Nature’”, in McGill Hume 
Studies, ed. Nicholas Capaldi, David F. Norton, and Wade L. Robison (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1976), 23–41. 
34  “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 623 n. H (this passage was withdrawn from all editions from 1768). 
35 In 1751 Hume noted that he had only recently “burn’d an old Manuscript Book, wrote before I was twenty [c.1729]; 
which contain’d, Page after Page, the gradual Progress of my Thoughts” on religion: Hume to Gilbert Elliot, 10 Mar. 
1751, in Letters, i, 154. In a letter to Henry Home, dated 2 Dec. 1737, Hume regretted that he was engaged in 
“castrating my work, that is, cutting off its nobler parts” before sending it to Joseph Butler, and he enclosed “some 
Reasonings concerning Miracles, which I once thought of publishing with the rest, but which I am afraid will give too 
much offence, as the world is disposed at present”: Letters, i, 23–25. M.A. Stewart declares that in “Of Miracles”, 
Hume’s “project is, in effect, to make Locke consistent”: “Hume’s Historical View of Miracles”, in Hume and Hume’s 
Connexions, ed. M.A. Stewart and John P. Wright (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 183. Stephen 
Buckle similarly emphasises how the incorporation of Essays X and XI of the Philosophical Essays into the Treatise 
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“castrat[ed]” form in which it was published, A Treatise nonetheless made the argument clearly 
enough that the question of God’s attributes, will, design, and sanctions had no place in true moral 
philosophy.36 Locke’s attempt to tie the moral codes by which societies were regulated inextricably 
to God’s will and command—and hence to justify them on the basis of their truth, rather than explain 
them in terms of their public utility and agreeableness—was untenable. It once again reintroduced 
“final causes” which could not be established on the basis of reason. Hume made this point most 
forcefully in his famous passage in Book III of A Treatise denying that an “ought” could be deduced 
from an “is”: this represented an “imperceptible” departure from the “ordinary way of reasoning”, 
and took place as soon as the existence of God had (supposedly) been established (T 3.1.1: 27). 
Meanwhile the existence—or otherwise—of a future state, which for Locke ought to offer the 
strongest incentive to virtue for the Christian, was utterly irrelevant to any explanation of moral 
motivation (e.g.: T 1.3.9: 13). 
The scholarship on Hume’s critical engagement with Lockean philosophy has focused 
almost exclusively on Hume’s epistemology in Book I of A Treatise.37 For the purposes of this 
discussion, however, I want to divert attention elsewhere: to the second Enquiry, and to the two works 
to which it is intimately related: the Natural History of Religion (1757) and the Dialogues.38 Cicero 
occupies a central place in all three works. Hume repeatedly opined that the Enquiry was 
“incomparably the best” of his writings.39 In it, he addressed most directly what he recognised in 1734 
to be the greatest challenge facing philosophers, and one which Cicero had apparently confronted: 
that of offering a complete moral theory which did not depend on “final causes”.40 In a highly 
revealing statement, Hume alerts us to this point: “whatever is valuable in any kind so naturally 
classes itself under the division of useful or agreeable, the utile or the dulce, that it is not easy to 
imagine, why we should ever seek farther” (EPM, 72).   
When set against Locke’s interpretation of Cicero, we are better placed to grasp the extent 
of Hume’s claim here. In confining himself to utility and agreeableness, Hume argued that Cicero 
had correctly understood what a theory of morals and justice could and could not offer. As James 
Moore has noted, Hume quite explicitly claimed to follow Cicero in banishing the question of 
normative truth (the honestum) from moral philosophy: there was no need ever to “seek farther”, and 
push beyond the principles of utility and agreeableness. The empirical moral philosopher confined 
his enquiry to the question of recognition—how and why men identified particular qualities (in 
themselves and others) as morally estimable or opprobrious—rather than asking whether they were 
                                                          
would have indicated far more clearly to Hume’s contemporary reader the extent to which the work ought to be read 
as a critical response to Locke’s Essay: “Marvels, Miracles, and Mundane Order: Hume’s Critique of Religion in An 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:1 (2001), 1–31. 
36  For a discussion of the largely implicit, but evident irreligious implications of A Treatise, see Paul Russell, The Riddle 
of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism and Irreligion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
37 Hume himself laid claim to novelty primarily for the manner in which he had taken Lockean insights—on the 
association of ideas, and on probability—in a quite different direction: An Abstract of a Book Lately Published … 
(1740), in Treatise, i, 416, 408–409.  
38 The Natural History was probably composed at the same time as, or shortly after, Hume’s initial draft of the Dialogues 
(that is, at Ninewells in c.1749–1751). In a letter to his publisher, Andrew Millar, of 12 June 1755, Hume noted that 
it was one of “four short Dissertations, which I have kept some Years by me”: Letters, i, 223. 
39  “My Own Life” (1776), in Essays, xxxvi; Hume to David Dalrymple, 3 May 1753, and to the Abbé le Blanc, 5 Nov. 
1755, in Letters, i, 175, 227. 
40  A similar explanation of Hume’s high valuation of the EPM is offered by James Moore, “Utility and Humanity”, 
Utilitas 14:3 (2002), 365–86. This is not to suggest that the EPM departed in any particularly significant way from 
the Treatise; merely that Hume developed his central contentions more expeditiously. As in the Philosophical Essays 
(later the first Enquiry), “the philosophical Principles” were the same as those of the Treatise, but “by shortening & 
simplifying the Questions, I really render them much more complete”: Hume to Gilbert Elliot, Mar./Apr. 1751, in 
Letters, i, 158. 
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correct in these judgements.41 Hume’s blunt denial in A Treatise that there “is a real right or wrong; 
that is, a real distinction in morals, independent of [the] judgments” made by men in the course of 
“common life” should be taken seriously (T 3.1.1: 14).42 Locke’s similar scepticism regarding 
philosophy’s claim to identify man’s true end was informed by a conviction that the Christian 
revelation could make good the deficit: this was absolutely necessary to prevent the slide into ethical 
relativism. Hume, taking Cicero as his guide, accepted the first point and denied the second.  
Hume, as (on his presentation) had Cicero, refused to “fetter his moral sentiments by 
narrow systems”, and defined virtue solely in terms of its utility and agreeableness (EPM, 106 n.72). 
Explicitly adopting Cicero’s “Catalogue of the Virtues”, Hume encompassed every quality “which 
contributes to the happiness of society, [and] recommends itself directly to our approbation and good 
will”, thereby including those “natural Abilitys” with which men were endowed (good looks, 
strength, and so forth) with little effort on their part (EPM, 38).43 Hume expressed his surprise that so 
few philosophers had been willing to admit the principle of utility into their “systems of ethics” (EPM, 
34). Yet Cicero had not committed the error of modern Epicureans, such as Hobbes and Mandeville, 
who scandalised contemporaries by reducing all virtue to base self-interest and self-love. Here, once 
again, Hume’s approach mirrored Cicero’s own in its refusal to identify one, ultimate principle which 
explained the ethical universe. “It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have 
humanity or a fellow-feeling with others”, Hume declared (EPM, 38 n. 19). In A Treatise, Hume had 
called this “sympathy”; but in the EPM, he preferred “humanity”, a term with unmistakably 
Ciceronian resonance (humanitas).44 The individual’s willingness to abide by the moral codes which 
regulated their society—that is, their sense of the obligatory character of the duties enshrined within 
them—was primarily the consequence of man’s natural concern for the esteem of others, in ways 
Locke had similarly sought to theorise but with considerably less nuance or complexity. Men came 
to take pleasure (“pride”) in behaving in a manner approved of by others—even to the point of 
actively exerting themselves on others’ behalf (“benevolence”), sometimes in ways which seemingly 
contradicted their own narrow self-interest. Hume similarly cited Cicero in support of his claim that 
natural and positive law developed in tandem, according to what was found to be in the public interest. 
Locke’s separation of the two, and foundation of a right of resistance on the basis of natural law, was 
as untenable as Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s political account of the origins of ethics (EPM, 13). 
Hume first discussed the implications of his ethical theory for religion in a letter to William 
Mure of 1743. Men, Hume noted, were naturally attuned to experience “love and gratitude for 
whatever is benevolent and beneficial”. This echoed Cicero’s claim in De Officiis that “when we 
think people possess these virtues, we are compelled by nature to love them”.45 Although a deity 
might possess the moral “attributes in the greatest perfection”, it was evident that unlike one’s fellow 
man “he is not the object of any passion or affection”. Hume observed that even a “remote ancestor, 
who has left us estates and honours” was sufficiently “unknown to us” as to fail to stimulate any 
considerable affection or gratitude. This being so, how could any affection be felt towards “an 
invisible infinite spirit” that was utterly incomprehensible to man?46 This example of the remote 
ancestor was lifted, without acknowledgement, from Cicero’s De Natura Deorum. In that work the 
academic sceptic Cotta pronounced both justice and morality to be “the offspring of human society 
                                                          
41 A point properly emphasised by Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind: Essays on the Mind and Morals (London: 
Methuen, 1985), 257. 
42  For the most sustained attempt to interpret Hume as a moral realist, see David F. Norton, David Hume: Common-
Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
43  As Hume observed, Hutcheson—along with most of his contemporaries—denied that the natural abilities ought to be 
defined as virtues: Letters, i, 33–34. 
44  As noted by Moore, “Utility and Humanity”. 
45  On Duties, 2.32 (italics added). 
46 Hume to Mure, 30 June 1743, in Letters, i, 50. 
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and of the commonwealth of man”.47 “The divine bestowal of reason upon man”, Cotta continued, 
“is not in itself an act of beneficence, like the bequest of an estate”. The latter act stimulated a degree 
of affection and gratitude towards one’s (immediate) benefactor, whereas men experienced no such 
sentiments with regard to any deity.48 Meanwhile, Cotta observed, “our virtue is a just ground for 
others’ praise and a right reason for our own pride, and this would not be so if the gift of virtue came 
to us from a god and not from ourselves”.49 The conclusion to be drawn from this, Hume informed 
Mure, was that piety and religious devotion were both unnatural and potentially corrupting of the 
socialised individual’s affective responses.50 
Hume’s moral theory, as Thomas Holden has convincingly argued, went well beyond a 
Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment when it came to the question of God’s nature and attributes.51 In 
this regard Hume advertised the fact that he went further than had Cicero, who on this point had 
broadly accepted a Pyrrhonian submission to custom and tradition in matters of religion. Hume 
declared that in De Natura Deorum, “CICERO, being a great sceptic in matters of religion” was 
“unwilling to determine any thing on that head among the different sects of philosophy”.52 Here the 
operative word is “unwilling”: there is no suggestion that Cicero was unable to “determine anything 
on that head”. Why might Cicero have refrained from drawing more determinate conclusions 
regarding the various truth-claims made for religion by his contemporaries? Here Hume drew 
attention to the morally and politically benign character of Roman paganism. The national religion in 
Rome “hung loose upon the minds of men”, embraced no contradictions, and contained no moral 
component (NHR XII: 75). Cicero, it followed, had defended the national Roman religion solely on 
account of its political utility and ethical benignity. Had Cicero deemed it necessary or desirable, 
Hume intimated, he could have offered a far more thoroughgoing critique of religion. If ancient 
polytheism was largely harmless in its moral consequences, however, the same could not be said for 
Christian theism. It was for this reason that it was more incumbent on the modern philosopher to 
examine the truth-claims of religion than it had been in Cicero’s age. In more recent times, 
“philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, have been more closely united with theology than ever 
they were observed to be among the Heathens”. Here Hume shared Locke’s conviction regarding the 
separation between ethics and divinity in the heathen world. The consequences of the subsequent 
union between the two fields in a Christian age were quite different for Hume than for Locke: the 
introduction of a theistic God as moral legislator had “warped from their natural course” the 
“unbiassed sentiments of the mind” and corrupted all “reasoning” in ethics (EPM, 108-109). As a 
result Hume, writing in a Christian age and for a predominantly Christian audience, offered to make 
explicit the implications of Ciceronian moral philosophy for religion. 
In De Natura Deorum, Cicero’s Cotta challenged his Stoic and Epicurean friends (Balbus 
and Velleius) to convince him “of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of 
faith merely but as an ascertained fact”.53 Unless they were able to do so, all subsequent debate 
regarding the deity’s supposed nature and attributes was nothing more than a “verbal” discrepancy.54 
                                                          
47 De Natura Deorum, trans. Harry Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 3.15.38. 
48 Ibid., 3.28.71. 
49 Ibid., 3.36.87. 
50 Hume to Mure, 30 June 1743, in Letters, i, 50. 
51 This general interpretation of Hume as a “strong” moral atheist—one who positively denied that the deity possessed 
moral attributes, rather than merely asserting that those attributes could not be known—supports the recent thesis of 
Thomas Holden, Spectres of False Divinity. Hume’s Moral Atheism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Compare and contrast with James Noxon, “Hume’s Agnosticism”, Philosophical Review 73:2 (1964), 248–61. 
52 “Rise and Progress”, 623 n. H (italics added). This passage is misinterpreted by Price, “Cicero and Hume”, who 
suggests that Hume made precisely the opposite point (that Cicero always declared his opinion in such matters). For 
a more accurate reading, see Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, ii, 251. 
53 De Natura Deorum, 1.22.61. 
54 Ibid., 1.7.16. 
Tim Stuart-Buttle (Cambridge)                Antiquity and Enlightenment Culture: draft chapter 
12 
 
His antagonists, however, were reluctant to begin with the question of the bare existence of the deity: 
it was for this reason that Cicero’s academic interlocutor, Cotta, accused them of lacking “the courage 
... to deny that the gods exist”.55 In the Dialogues, Hume’s Philo similarly sought to return the debate 
to this essential starting-point. If one did so, the consequences were clear. Even if one were willing to 
accept the highly “ambiguous” proposition that “the cause or causes of order in the universe probably 
bear some remote analogy to human intelligence”, this was a proposition that “affords no inference 
that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance” (DNR XII: 101-102). 
Reason not only afforded no grounds whatsoever for envisaging a deity possessed of moral attributes. 
It could go further, as Hume had suggested most forcefully in the second Enquiry. Men’s moral 
sentiments were confined to human life and were the product of an affective psychology possessed 
solely by men. Any religion which entertained the idea of a deity (or deities) as a moral legislator and 
governor, and thereby possessed of moral attributes, was demonstrably false, and a form of 
superstitious anthropomorphism. Here Hume quite consciously moved beyond Cicero: something 
that, he intimated, was necessary in a Christian age in which religion asphyxiated rather than “hung 
loose upon the minds of men”. 
This point can be illustrated most succinctly by considering “Of the Immortality of the 
Soul” (1777), which reads like a digest of extracts drawn from Cicero’s philosophical writings.56 
Hume began precisely where Locke had left off, citing 2 Timothy 1.10 (the doctrine was ultimately 
“brought to light” by Christ). Hume emphasised the importance of establishing religious principles 
on cognitive rather than affective grounds, since “all doctrines are to be suspected, which are favoured 
by our passions”.57 Hume was in no doubt that the doctrine of a future state originated in the “hopes 
and fears” that actuated the human mind. The question remained as to whether it had a foundation in 
reason. As had Locke, Hume divided the evidence into three categories: metaphysical, physical, and 
moral. As had Locke, Hume paraphrased the Tusculan Disputations almost verbatim in order to reject 
the metaphysical and physical arguments, and show that both led to atheism. When he came to 
consider the moral arguments upon which Locke had laid such weight—and which, Locke claimed, 
Cicero had endorsed—Hume drew from a source that Locke had studiously avoided in his 
discussion.58 This was De Natura Deorum, the work in which Cotta had similarly challenged his 
antagonists to prove the principles they sought to defend on reason alone. Hume’s arguments to 
undermine the moral evidence in favour of the doctrine were identical to those employed by Cotta to 
refute Balbus. Moral arguments, both argued, were grounded on the fallacious assumption that God 
could be known to possess attributes—justice, goodness, benevolence, power—“beyond what he has 
exerted in this universe”, but which “according to human sentiments” were “essential parts of 
personal merit”. This was to once again fall into the error of supposing “that human sentiments have 
place in the deity”, when the “chief source of moral ideas”, as with men’s ideas regarding justice, “is 
the reflection on the interests of human society”.59 Hume’s point was not simply that a truly 
Ciceronian, empirical moral theory had no need to invoke God or a future state in order to explain 
moral obligation. Rather, its ability to explain morality with exclusive reference to the unique 
characteristics of human nature illustrated the inherent groundlessness and falsity of moral theologies 
of every stripe.    
                                                          
55 Ibid., 1.31.87. 
56 This point is missed entirely by commentators including J.C.A. Gaskin, who provides the most thorough discussion 
of the essay: Hume’s Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 166–82. 
57 “Of the Immortality of the Soul” (1777), in Essays, 590–98 (on 598). 
58 This is not to suggest that Locke was Hume’s sole target, not least since Butler had similarly defended the doctrine 
primarily on the basis of moral evidence: Paul Russell, “Butler’s ‘Future State’ and Hume’s ‘Guide to Life’”, Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 42:4 (2004), 425–48. 
59 “Immortality of the Soul”, 592–96 (italics added). 




For Locke, Cicero’s moral philosophy, by banishing final causes and focusing on utility and 
agreeableness, left a conceptual space which had subsequently been filled by Christ’s revelation. This 
vindicated Locke’s own, highly distinctive conceptual separation between moral motivation and 
obligation. Revelation delivered what men both desired and required, but could not establish by their 
own natural lights: an account of the summum bonum, and an explanation of why the duties they were 
nonetheless motivated to perform on the basis of their utility and agreeableness were also morally 
obligatory. Hume, conversely, presented Cicero as entirely closing off this avenue.60 In Hume’s 
hands, Ciceronian academic scepticism unequivocally denied the very possibility of a harmony 
between empirical moral philosophy and Christian moral theology.  
Hume’s interpretation of Cicero, it should be said, might bring this essay to a close but in 
no way represents the end of this story. Hume’s critics, especially in Scotland, recognised the 
importance of this interpretation of Cicero to Hume’s exposition of his own philosophy more clearly 
than have modern scholars. From the first such critic of his moral theory, Francis Hutcheson, onwards, 
the attempt to challenge the devastating consequences of Hume’s moral theory for Christian ethics 
was accompanied by a rejection of his interpretation of the meaning and significance of Cicero’s 
philosophy.  
In 1742, shortly after the publication of A Treatise, Hutcheson denied in his Philosophiae 
Moralis Institutio Compendiara what Hume had implicitly maintained: that in De Officiis Cicero 
offered “a complete system of morals or ethics”, and thereby banished the question of “the supreme 
good, which is the principal part of ethics”. De Officiis was, in this regard, merely a theory of 
politeness intended for youths seeking to make their way in the world, rather than a theory of morals 
properly so-called. Instead Hutcheson argued that in his more systematic works of moral theory—De 
Finibus and the Tusculan Disputations—Cicero had in fact followed the Stoics in maintaining that 
utility and agreeableness alone were insufficient to explain moral obligation: virtue must be its own 
reward.61 James Beattie similarly opined that “Cicero seems to have been an Academic rather in name 
than in reality”, as “when the subject of his inquiry is of high importance, as in his books on moral 
duties, and on the nature of the gods, he follows the doctrine of the Dogmatists, particularly the Stoics; 
and asserts his moral and religious principles with a warmth and energy which prove him to have 
been in earnest”.62 Notwithstanding his very different treatment of morals, Thomas Reid followed 
Beattie on this point: “though an Academic, [Cicero] was dogmatical” in his moral theory, identifying 
“self-evident truths” in ethics as in religion.63 By this means Hume’s critics sought to deny his claim 
that Ciceronian academic scepticism represented a discrete (and superior) tradition in the history of 
moral philosophy. As this essay indicates, the question of Cicero’s philosophical commitments was 
deemed to be of the utmost importance to early modern philosophers, for whom the relationship 
between ethics and religion remained a profoundly vexed issue. By the nineteenth century, in contrast, 
this earlier interest in Cicero as a philosopher in his own right—rather than merely a doxographer, 
                                                          
60 Here Rivers’s claim that Hume’s intention in the Dialogues may have been “to rescue Cicero from his Christian 
readers and restore him to scepticism” can be applied more broadly to a far greater number of Hume’s writings: 
Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, ii, 277. 
61 I have cited the English translation of the work: Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, 2 vols. 
(Glasgow, 1747), I, vi–vii. 
62 James Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (Edinburgh, 1770), 2.2.1, 243–44. 
63 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), ed. Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2002), 6.2, 452–53 (referring to De Oratore); 6.6, 500 (to De Finibus). 
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crudely summarising the teachings of others but contributing little that was novel to western 
philosophical thought—had come to seem curious indeed.64   
                                                          
64 Here the central figure in disparaging Cicero’s significance was Theodore Mommsen: see Nicholas P. Cole, 
“Nineteenth-Century Ciceros”, in The Cambridge Companion to Cicero, ed. Catherine Steel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 337–49. 
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